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A CATHOLIC VIEW OF MERCY KILLING
Daniel C. Maguire
1-,
A ccording to a still extant truism, this article would appear to be 
^mistitled. As the truism has it. there is only the Catholic 
opinion on mercy killing; to speak of a Catholic opinion, thus 
implying the peaceful coexistence of other opinions, would appear 
to be a contradiction in the terms ofjnonolithic Catholicism. The 
truism, however, is false. There is vigorous dispute among 
Catholics on th^s issue, as indeed there is on all issues of contem­
porary moral debate.
The truism, of course, was grounded in a position commonly 
identified as the Catholic position. Pope Pius XI was speaking for 
a long-dominant ethical tradition when he said; “What could ever 
be a sufficient reason for excusing in any way the direct n^(irder of 
the innocent?" Pius XII, using the same categories, condemned 
the “deliberate and direct disposing of an innocent human life." 
Thus one could morally kill an aggressor in self-defense if there 
were i^ less drastic alternatives, but one could not directly kill 
innocent life (that is, intentionally will it, as either an end or a 
means). Obviously, this rubric effectively drummed out of court 
any possibility of moral abortion-or moral mercy killing. Both werC 
seen as direct killing of the innocent and, as such, were considered 
murder.
This tradition, however absolutely opposed it was to the direct 
termination of life, was rather nuanced and advanced regarding 
the indirect termination of life. As the Cathofic theologian Joseph 
V. Sullivan put it, indirect action “may be defined as an action or 
omission having some other immediate effect in addition to the 
death of a person. Such a death, even when foreseen to follow an 
act. need not be intended in itself, but can be merely permitted." 
^he Morality of Mercy Killing, The Newman Press, Westminster, 
d., 1950) This distinction may seem unduly donnish, but the 
results of it were often quite practical. For example, one could give 
a large dose of sedative to a patient though it was foreseen that 
the dose would probably accelerate the dying process. Bringing on 
death more quickly was only being permitted and thus indirectly 
willed and so. in this view, could be deemed moral. Closely related 
to this was the papally endorsed teaching that only ordinary means 
need be used to prolong life. Extraordinary means were any means 
that involved a grave burden for oneself or for another. If a 
comatose patient was being maintained by a respirator, and it was 
clear after several days that- the loss of consciousness was
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permanent, it would be morally right to “pull the plug," that is, to 
stop the respirator. As Cardinal Jean Villot. Vatican Secretary of 
State, put it in his address to the International Federation of 
Catholic Medical Associations in 1970:
... a medical man does not have to use all the techniques of survi­
val offered him by a constantly creative science. In many cases 
would it not 1^ useless torture to impose vegetative resuscitation in 
the final stages of an incurable sickness? The doctor's duty here is 
rather to ease the suffering instead of prolonging as long as 
possible, by any means whatsoever and in any condition whatsoever, 
a life no longer fully human and which is closing to its natural 
end ...
Therefore, it can be seen that this particular Catholic position, 
though it put the direct termination of nonaggressive life under a 
taboo, was quite sensitive to the human moral right to a good 
death. It defended our right to die without the oppressive intrusion 
of unavailing heroics. In this regard, this venerable teaching is far 
ahead of the ethical positions enshrined in current American legal 
structures, where even the suspension of extraordinary means re­
mains enmeshed in legal ambiguity.
I have accepted the invitation to offer a Catholic viewpoint on 
mercy killing.* My position is this: In a medical context, it may be 
moral and should be legal to accelerate the death process by taking 
direct action, such as overdosing with morphine or injecting potas­
sium. and so on. A fortiori, the use of extraordinary means » 
morally Optional. I have argued this position extensively in my 
book Death by Choice (Doubleday. Carden City. N.Y., 1974). Here 
I will incorporate my position into a demonstration of the fact that 
it is compatible with historical Catholic ethical theory.
Catholics and Situation Ethica
Jt is difllcult to speak of anyone's relationship to "situation 
'‘^ethics," since situation ethics is a clumsy umbrella term that 
covers .many disparate ethical methodologies. The Catholic scene 
illustrates the equivocal nature of the term. In 1956, the Holy 
Office issued an instruction saying:
... in order to safeguard the purity and security of Catholic doc­
trine. this Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Oflke forbids 
and prohibits this doctrine of “Situation Ethics" by whatever name 
it is designated, to be taught or approved in Universities. Acade­
mies. Seminaries and Houses of Formatioa of Religious, or to be 
propagated and defended in books, dissertations, assemblies, or. as 
tliey are called, conferences, or-in any other manner whatsoever.
Oiythe other hand, we find the priest-theologian Louis Monden, 
S.J.. Avriting that, with all the proper distinctions having been
*1 eschew Ibe lerni "eulhanasia" whenever possible because I find il so scarrad by 
variegated usage. For many people, il ineaorably connolcs Nari euthanasia practices. 
Some use it to refer to both direct or indirect causation of death. Others say that it 
means only the cessalkm of eitraordinary means in the contemporary conual. A word 
that means to much to so many is somewhat out of linguistic control. The adjective 
"benefjceni" redeems il somewhat in this journal, but not sufficiently, in my jstdg-
(^Numanbt-
made, “We must clearly afTirm with the great classical authors. 
that Catholic morality is. in fact, a situation ethics." (Sin, Liberty, 
and Law. Sheed and Ward, New York, l%5) What Monden is 
saying here is really self-evident. There can be no ethics that does 
not assess the moral significance of the situation being judged. In 
the classical just-war theory (which has long been held in honor in 
Catholic thinking), for example, one could not tell a just war frdm 
an unjust one without analyzing the situation and seeing what 
moral meaning was contained in the empirical realities of the con­
flict in question. In a word, no system of ethics could know the 
morality or immorality of an action or a process without being sen­
sitive to the situational factors that make.up the reality of the case. 
Whether one is killing out of self-defense or out of lust makes for a 
different situation and different moral meaning. If that is situation 
ethics, then all ethics is situational by the very fact that it must 
assess the morality of situationed persons.
Thus Thomas Aquinas is speaking rudimentary good ethical 
sense when he says, in Summa Theoiogiae, “human actions are 
good or bad according to their circumstances." In the sense that 
all ethics is situation ethics. Aquinas is also a situationist in ethics. 
He recognizes that circumstances make a difference in the 
morality of concrete situations.
There is,, of course, a strong temptation to ignore this rudimen­
tary insight into the morally differentiating meaning of circum­
stances. Making distinctions where there ate differences is good 
logic and good ethics; but, in cases where we sense great possibility 
of abuse, the moral community frequently retreats to the simplism 
of Uboo. The taboo menulity considers certain classes of actions 
as bad “regardless of the circumstances." The stimulus for taboo 
comes from the perceived security of knowing that what cannot be 
used cannot be abused. Taboo lifts a particular kind of conduct 
out of real, distinction-making ethics and puts it under an undif­
ferentiating ban and proscriptioa
This is what has been done regarding mercy killing in many 
moral communities, including the Catholic community. It is the 
singular lot of'humankind to know the prospect of death and to 
stand in awe of it. For- the theist and the atheist, death sustains its 
mystery. This mystery can only be pierced by entering the exper­
ience, but we hesitate, quite naturally, wondering with Hamlet 
what awaits us in the sleep of death. On the battlefield, of course, 
the primitive instincts of vengeance and of anger bom of threat 
blunt our sensitivities before the dread fact of death. But off the 
battlefield, in situations where compassion, not anger, is the 
dominant emotion, we shy from choosing death for ourselves-or for 
others. This instinct is a good one. It is an instinct to be fortified 
with reflection. It is not, however, an instinct to be frozen into 
indeterminate taboO.
Taboo knows no exceptions, and that is its weakness. But life, 
which ethics seeks to evaluate, is marked by both the regular and 
the exceptional. Such is our reality. Not to recognize either rule or 
exception is to become unreal, or, in ethical terms, immorql. Rules 
and exceptions both serve human life. If being moral is loving 
well—and I submit that it is—then it must be experienced in life 
and manifested in ethics that love dictates both rules and excep­
tions to them. Neither rules nor exceptions enjoy a primacy. It is 
life, which is both regular and exceptional, that is primary.
Applying this again to the question of mercy kilting, let it be said 
that it is a good commendable principle to care for the dying. We 
should company with them, anticipate and meet their needs. 
Though dying is natural, it is rarely easy. In a Faustian, can-do 
culture, such as that which dominates in the United States, gravely 
ill persons can succumb to the pragmatic heresy that usefulness, 
pr^uctivity. and dignity are as one. The duty of those who are
living and well to those who are living and dying is to help them 
experience their dignity and possibility to the end. -They are still 
capable of the distinctive activities of personhood. They can 
receive and give love; they can laugh and respond to beauty, they 
can still create and care and console. If we must descend to prag­
matic language, then let it be said that their lives are still useful. 
The principle here then is: care for, cherish, and preserve the life 
of dying persons. And that principle is a good one—but the aspect 
of preserving life is not an absolute.
Here let us turn again to the thought of Thomas Aquinas. 
Principles, Thomas taught, are of two kinds: those that have no 
exceptions and those that do. The exceptionless principles (which 
Thomas called the primary precepts of the natural law) include 
such things as "do good and avoid evil” and “act reasonably." 
The problem with such principles, of course, is that they do not 
contain information about what is good or evil or reasonable. They 
are so uncontaminated with particularizing and complicating con­
tent that they can well afford to be exceptionless. So Thomas 
leaves them quickly and goes on to the secondary principles, or to 
what could be called practical moral principles. These principles 
contain-some complicating content They are: Do not kill; do not 
take people's property; tell the truth; and so on. These principles 
are applicable most of the time (in pluribus); in particular cases (in 
aliguo particulari el in paucioribus). they may not apply.
As an example, Thomas notes that it is a good principle to 
return things to their owner. However, enter the morally signifi­
cant circumstance of the owner's interition to do serious harm with 
the object held, and the principle can be seen as nonapplicable. In 
effKt, a value that is more important in this situation takes prece­
dence. This, says Thomas, is the way of all ethics. Monogamy is 
clearly a value in Thomas' thinking, and it may be expressed as a 
principle. Yet even here, he notes, particular circumstances may in 
fact permit a plurality of wives.
According to this theory, therefore, one could say that the 
principle of caring for and preserving the dying person's life gives a 
firm rule of conduct in pluribus. but in aliquo particulari this good 
principle may cease to apply. In particular cases, caring for and 
cherishing the dying patient may mean not preserving him in a life 
he can no longer sustain.
The decision here is. of course, the patient's, as long as the 
patient is mentally competent to make it. Itfalls to someone else to 
decide only by default, when the patient cannot make the decision 
and has not in advance provided for what decision he or she would 
like made in specified circumstances. When the patient is perma­
nently unconscious and no such prior provision has been made, the 
decision falls to those who are really or equivalently the next of kin 
in emergency situations. Legal safeguards for this moral situation 
would have to attend carefully to the ever possible conflicts of 
interest and other possible abuses. To say that law could never 
guard against all the possible abuses of such an extension of moral 
freedom and that therefore mercy killing should be considered 
immoral always and everywhere is to fall under the indictment of 
the ancient adage: qui nimis probat. nihil probai (he who proves 
too much, proves nothing). This is the hackneyed argument of the 
legal rigorisL who feels that only frozen categories are safe. (In 
moral language, it is the argument of the tabooist) It is the argu­
ment that has been thrown against the legalization of every ad­
vance of human freedom iii the history of mores and of law. It is, 
for example, the argument that was used against conscientious 
objection until the Quakers beat it down in England in 1802. It is 
the argument that is still used against selective conscientious ob­
jection in the United SUtes. It is an argument that must be 
listened to, for it is sensitive to'dangers that reformists might
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underestimate. Bb^i/is an argument that attempts to prove too 
much, and, as such, is flawed.*
Therefore, it can be seen that the Catholic ethical tradition is 
not lacking in contextual sensitivity (I prefer "contextuar to the 
ambivalent “situationar'). This traditioh. as any viable ethical 
tradition, allows for the import of morally meaningful, empirical 
variables. By wfiatever name, this appreciation is indispensable to 
ethics. More to our point, it gives no aid and comfort to those who 
would wrap an absolute negative aj^ujid the subject of mercy 
killing.
Catholics and Moral Ambiguity
'T'he Catholic position that condemned all mercy killing, because 
it is the direct taking of innocent life, is liable to several charges 
of theoretical deficiency. For one thing, it made the categories of 
directness and indirectness cany iir^ moral freight than they 
could bear. Whpther one intends to inflict death as a means or 
end, or whether one [lermits it as an unavoidable consequence of 
another necessary action, does indeed make for some morally 
significant differences. The distinction could be ignored only at the 
peril of skewing ethical analysis. However, recent Catholic thinkers 
have been stressing that, more important than directness~or-4n- 
directnCss. is the question of whether there is proportionate reason 
to permit or intend a death. This rubric was always present in the 
traditional Catholic ethics. In much writing, however, it was 
effectively submerged under the directness/indirectness issue. 
Significant Catholic writers are now pointing this out, and this 
opens the way to a revolution in Catholic thinking in areas such as 
mercy killing.
Proportionality is not as easily determined as psychological 
directness or indirectness. Whether or not in certain circumstances 
continued living is preferable to death is much more difficult to 
ascertain than deciding whether one is intending or permitting 
death. The move to a renewed stress on proportionate reason as 
central to ethical analysis is a move to greater ambiguity. It is also 
a move that is not congenial to taboo thinking, characterized as 
this is by a complete lack of ambiguity. The old certitude that 
accelerating the death process was always wrong must yield to an 
agonizing and never translucent assessment of whether or not 
\here is proportionate reason to induM death. The appreciation of 
ambiguity, however unsettling, is nonetheless the badge of moral 
maturity.
For Catholics, it is also a retui^ to a tradition and history that in 
its finer moments came to grips with the undefeatable ambiguity 
of mahy concrete moral questions. Because of the penitential prac­
tice of confession. Catholics moral theology had to speak to the 
problem of uncertain conscience. WluUva^ to be done when there 
was an insoluble dispute about a specific issue of morality where 
1here were good reasons and good expert moralists on both sides of 
the debate? Various so-called moral systems developed to meet 
this problem. One system, “absolute tutiorism" (from the Latin 
tutior), taught that an opinion that expands one's moral freedom 
may never be followed unless it is clearly certain. According to this 
system, when there was a debated moral issue, one had to stay with 
the more rigorous and conservative side of the debate until all 
doubt was cleared up. Even though the liberal opinion had strong 
authority behind it and was supported by many good arguments, 
one could not act morally in this view unless all doubts tha4 the
*By wiy of self-defense end not of edvertisement. I must cell ettention lo the fact 
that I treated the various objections to mercy killing, where one decides for one's self 
and where one decides for another, in chapters sii and seven of OearA by Choice. 
There, space permitted me to attend to more of the complexities of these matters.
oppoking view was false were dispelled. 'This system was con­
demned on December 7. I690. by Pope Alexander VIII. The sig­
nificance of this condemnation should be obviousi It constituted a 
papal acknowledgment of moral ambiguity and a notable en­
dorsement of human moral freedom.
Another system,, which came to be known by the unflattering 
name of “laxism" (several of whose defenders won the title "the 
prince of the laxists"), taught that in a debated issue, any opinion 
that enjoyed even the most tenuous probability could be followed 
in good conscience. This opinion wak also condemned by the 
Church.
Between these two systems many others flourished, encumbered 
by such names as mitigated tutiorism, probabilibrism, equiproba- 
bilism. compensationism. and probabilism. Probabilism ulti­
mately prevailed, and its success and very general acceptance in 
the Church is worthy of note.
Probabilism taught thar on a debated issue one was free to act 
on a position that enjoyed solid probability even though it 
appeared that the more rigorous opinion was even more probable. 
Solid probability was determined by the presence of good and 
serious reasons (intrinsic probability) or by representative support 
of respected moralists (extrinsic probability).* The cardinal princi­
ples of this system were lex dubia non obligat (a doubtful law does 
not oblige) and ubi dubium ibi libertas (where there is doubt there 
is freedom). Thus, on a debated issue, one could adopt and act on 
one probable opinion among many, even though other opinions 
were admittedly mote probable. Clearly, probabilism is a very 
liberating theory and. although its insights are not sufficiently 
repiesenied in modern official Catholic pronouncements on speci­
fic moral issues, it remains a solid resource of the Catholic 
heritage.
As one quite traditional Catholic moralist. Father Henry Davis. 
S.J., put it. in Mora! and Pastoral Theology:
In its ultimale analysis. Probabilism is common sense; it is a system 
used in practical doubt by the majority of mankind. People rightly 
say: I am not going to debate all day before acting in doubtful 
matters; there miist be some very obvious way of making up my 
mind. At all events, if I cannot make up my mind for myself, I will 
act as some good people act. though many other good people might 
disapprove. That practical solution of doubt is common sense, and 
it is Probabilism.
: The subject of mercy killing today is entering into rapidly ex­
panding debate. Serious and grave reasons and objections are 
offered on both sides of the issue. Drawing from the Catholic tradi­
tion of probabilism. I would say that the position favoring the pos­
sibility of moral mercy killing in certain circumstances is more 
probable by reason of its intrinsic reasons and the inadequacy of 
the opposing objections. More moralists are beginning to concede 
this, and I judge that this is the -beginning of an irreversible trend.
Because the more fruitful resources of Catholic moral thought 
have been eclipsed by some recent and actually atypical rigidities 
in Catholic ethics, many may be surprised to find that Cathplic 
history offers some wise' and properly liberating ethical alterna­
tives. These resources will, I believe, be brought increasingly to 
bear on the opening debate on mercy killing. •
*Somc theologians taught that in some cases, even one author "of serious and ^reat 
name'ycould constitute a probable opinion. In the background of all this discusstoo 
was the possibility that the Church would step in and condemn a particular opinion. 
Since such an intervention by the ofRcial magisterium would be fallible, however, the 
"probability" ^Id perdure. See my essay "Moral Absolutes and the Magisterium" 
in Ahsoiytes in Moroi Tkeohgy^, Charles Curran, ed. (Corpus Books. Washington. 
D.C.. I96B1. In this essay. I argued that it is not meaningful to say (hat the Churchis 
infallible in determining concrete ethical truth. I have not met much opposition to 
(his view.
